Transposition of European Legislation into Prosecution Policy Guidelines: The Example of the Dutch Implementation of the Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in Criminal Proceedings by Geelhoed, W.
328 Intersentia
TRANSPOSITION OF EUROPEAN LEGISLATION 
INTO PROSECUTION POLICY GUIDELINES: 
THE EXAMPLE OF THE DUTCH 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FRAMEWORK 
DECISION ON THE STANDING OF VICTIMS 
IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Pim Geelhoed*
ABSTRACT
Th is article discusses the issue whether European law permits framework decisions and 
directives to be transposed into prosecution policy guidelines, taking the Dutch 
implementation of the Framework Decision on the standing of victims as an example. 
Although this Framework Decision was initially intended to be transposed into guidelines 
of the Public Prosecution Service, the Dutch Government chose to include transposition 
in the revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, combining eff orts for improvement of 
the victim’s position. Th is article discusses the legal status of Dutch victim policy and 
addresses the implementation of the relevant Framework Decision. Th is article concludes 
that it follows from the case law of the Court of Justice that the policy rules of the Public 
Prosecution Service do not have the legally binding nature that the transposition of the 
relevant Framework Decision requires.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Th e Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings1 
(hereinaft er referred to as ‘the Framework Decision’) is the fi rst binding international 
* PhD researcher, Institute for Criminal Law and Criminology, Leiden University.
1 Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA of 15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in 
criminal proceedings, OJ L 82, 22/3/2001, 1–4.
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instrument that addresses the status of victims in criminal proceedings. It so happens 
that in the Netherlands the victim’s position is not primarily laid down by law but in 
policy rules of the Public Prosecution Service. Originally, the Dutch Government 
took the view that with these existing victim arrangements, the Framework Decision 
had been suffi  ciently transposed. Some time aft er the European Commission had 
severely criticized the implementation of the Framework Decision in the Member 
States, the Dutch Government introduced a legislative proposal, however, designed to 
further defi ne the victim’s position in the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to 
the Government, this bill was based primarily on rethinking the basic principles of 
the Code and it was not a reaction to the European Commission’s criticism. Th e date 
of commencement of this legislative change will be 1 January 2011.
Th e debate on the implementation of the Framework Decision frequently 
addressed the question whether in general terms, transposition into policy rules of 
the Public Prosecution Service is suffi  cient or whether the statutory rules concerning 
victims must be amended. Th e latter would mean that the Public Prosecution Service 
is no longer free to adopt rules about the victim’s position in criminal proceedings. 
Even though the Code of Criminal Procedure has been supplemented regularly in 
the course of time by provisions defi ning the victim’s position in criminal proceedings, 
the nearly complete codifi cation of victim policy rules would narrow the policy-
making scope of the Public Prosecution Service even much further, in favour of the 
legislator.
It remains to be seen, however, whether this shift  in powers is dictated by 
European transposition requirements. Th is article deals with the question whether 
European law dictates that framework decisions must be transposed into primary 
legislation (i.e. Acts of Parliament) rather than policy rules adopted by the 
prosecution authorities. An affi  rmative answer may aff ect the implementation of 
other framework decisions and directives, for which reason the shift  in powers 
mentioned above could occur in other areas, too. In addition, the question arises 
whether framework decisions must be transposed according to the same criteria as 
directives or whether these are subject to diff erent regimes. Th e latter point is also 
relevant in view of the introduction of directives on police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters.
For various reasons, the implementation of the Framework Decision in Dutch law 
provides an example that is pre-eminently suited to illustrate this problem. First, it 
concerns a rare example of the harmonisation of national criminal procedure and 
relates not only to cross-border cooperation. Second, from an international 
perspective, the manner in which policy rules are used in the Netherlands is special 
in view of the broad discretionary powers of the Dutch Public Prosecution Service 
based on the expediency principle. Th ird, the transposition of this Framework 
Pim Geelhoed
330 Intersentia
Decision in the Netherlands was only recently completed,2 which enables the entire 
implementation process to be assessed. And fourth, experiences relating to the 
transposition of framework decisions keep their relevance now that they have been 
replaced by directives as a harmonisation instrument, because the requirements 
relating to the transposition of these instruments may well be exactly the same.
To provide an answer to the question, whether European law allows legislation to be 
transposed into prosecution policy guidelines, this article uses the implementation of 
the Framework Decision on the standing of victims as an example. As a background to 
the transposition debate, this article summarizes the legal status of Dutch victim policy. 
Further, it discusses the optimistic approach of the Dutch government and the 
Commission’s implementation report. Next, the subsequent legislative proposal is briefl y 
assessed. Th e last part of this article addresses the question whether the transposition 
satisfi es the Court’s requirements and whether prosecution policy guidelines would 
have suffi  ced instead of legislation. Th e question of European law allowing this method 
for transposing European legislation, it is found, is dependent on the content of the 
legislative instrument. Th erefore the use of the Framework Decision on victim care as 
an example can help to provide the necessary material to answer this question.
2. LEGAL STATUS OF VICTIM POLICY IN THE 
NETHERLANDS
Ever since the 1980s, the victim’s position in Dutch criminal law has generated 
considerable interest and it has been defi ned particularly in the policy rules of the 
Public Prosecution Service. Th ese policy rules on victim care address three key areas: 
they defi ne instructions to ensure the correct treatment of victims, to provide victims 
with all kinds of relevant information, and to promote compensation payable by 
perpetrators to victims. At present, these instructions are to be found mainly in the 
Victim Care Instructions (Aanwijzing slachtoff erzorg),3 but increasingly, statutory 
provisions are being enacted for the purpose of defi ning the victim’s position in 
criminal proceedings. Examples include the joinder of a party in criminal proceedings 
to pursue a civil claim (Article 51a of the Code of Criminal Procedure) and the right 
to speak in court (Article 302 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).
Policy rules refl ect the Public Prosecution Service’s statutory task of preserving 
law and order (Article 124 of the Judiciary (Organization) Act) and contain instructions 
that are binding on all members of the Public Prosecution Service. Th ey are adopted 
by the Board of Procurators General, which heads the Public Prosecution Service. Th e 
instructions are also published in the Netherlands Government Gazette. Th e Minister 
2 Act of 17 December 2009 to amend the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Criminal Code and the 
Damages Fund for Violent Crimes Act to strengthen the victim’s position in criminal proceedings, 
Bulletin of Acts and Decrees 2010, 1.
3 Instruction dated 13 April 2004, Government Gazette 2004, 80, registration number 2004A004.
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of Justice is at the pinnacle of the hierarchy and may issue general and special 
instructions to the Public Prosecution Service (Article 127 of the Judiciary 
(Organization) Act). Even though this power to issue instructions is hardly ever used 
in practice, its existence aff ects mutual relationships.
Th e Public Prosecution Service is obliged to exercise its tasks and powers in 
accordance with a policy. If this policy is published, it raises expectations that have to 
be fulfi lled on the ground of the legal principle of legitimate expectations. For this 
reason, any derogation from such policy, for example, by initiating a prosecution 
contrary to an instruction, may result in a sanction, the severest form of which that 
the Public Prosecution Service is barred from instituting criminal proceedings. Th ere 
is an exception to that, however: it is accepted that the prosecution authorities may 
derogate from a policy rule if this derogation is suffi  ciently substantiated. If any 
derogation from published policy instructions is insuffi  ciently substantiated, the court 
may bar the Public Prosecution Service from prosecuting a case because it has acted 
contrary to the duty to state reasons.4
A fundamental repositioning of the victim in criminal proceedings is advocated 
in the reports issued by the onderzoeksproject Strafvordering 2001 (‘Research Project 
on Criminal Procedure 2001’), a project that reassessed all aspects of Dutch criminal 
procedure. In view of the victim’s special involvement in a criminal off ence, his 
position should be placed on a statutory footing, enabling his interests to be taken into 
account in criminal proceedings to a suffi  cient degree.5 Th e researchers rejected policy 
rules, because subjective rights of victims should not be defi ned indirectly by means 
of obligations imposed on the police and judicial authorities.6 Th is basic principle has 
been of paramount importance to the legislative change that will soon take eff ect and 
that will codify much of the victim policy that still remains.
3. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF THE 
FRAMEWORK DECISION
3.1. THE FRAMEWORK DECISION
Th e objective of the Framework Decision is to off er a high level of protection to crime 
victims throughout the EU.7 It lays specifi c emphasis on the fact that EU citizens who 
4 For more information on this issue, see P.J.P. Tak, “Th e Dutch Prosecution Service”, in P.J.P. Tak 
(ed.), Tasks and Powers of the Prosecution Services in the EU Member States, Nijmegen, Wolf Legal 
Publishers, 2004, pp. 355–383.
5 M.S. Groenhuijsen & G. Knigge, Het onderzoek ter zitting. Eerste interimrapport onderzoeksproject 
Strafvordering 2001, Deventer, Gouda Quint, 2001, pp. 27, 37–39, 46–48.
6 Idem, p. 46. Th is phrase can also be found in a section written by M.S. Groenhuijsen on p. 249 of the 
subreport by A.L.J. van Strien, “De positie van slachtoff ers in het strafproces”, in idem, p. 233–274.
7 Recital 4 of the Framework Decision.
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fall victim to criminal off ences abroad are relatively worse off . Th e substantive 
provisions regulate all important aspects of the procedural position of victims.8 Th e 
Framework Decision provides that it must be transposed into ‘laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions’ (Article 17), terms that are derived from Article 34 (old) 
TEU. Article 18 provides that in the context of the evaluation, the Member States have 
to forward the text of ‘the provisions enacting into national law the requirements laid 
down by this Framework Decision’, aft er which the Council will evaluate the national 
‘measures’. Based on this formulation, it is by no means certain that Acts of Parliament 
are the only transposition instrument.
3.2. DUTCH NOTIFICATION
According to the Dutch Minister of Justice, the implementation of the Framework 
Decision ‘does not pose any problem. Th e victim care regulations comply with the 
provisions of the Framework Decision.’9 Th is position was also taken in the notifi cation 
from the Dutch Government to the Commission and the Council on the implementation 
of the Framework Decision.10 In this notifi cation, the minister refers to the instructions 
of the Public Prosecution Service many times, but also to practical arrangements and 
physical adjustments that have been made to court buildings, for example. Th e 
minister also speaks a few words on the incorporation of victim rights into a new 
statutory regulation: ‘Even though the Government is of the opinion that the 
Netherlands already complies with the provisions of the Framework Decision at this 
juncture, the possibility of enshrining signifi cant parts of existing policy in Acts of 
Parliament was contemplated.’ In this context, he considers the option of codifying 
the policy rules of the Public Prosecution Service, such as the Victim Care Instructions, 
and expresses his support for the proposals made by the Strafvordering 2001 research 
group, one of which concerned including a separate division on the victim in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the minister, the best way to improve the 
situation is by perfecting practice rather than by enshrining victim rights in primary 
legislation.
3.3. THE COMMISSION’S REPORT
In its report, the Commission emphasizes that the implementation of framework 
decisions is subject to the same requirements as those applicable to the implementation 
of directives. ‘Both instruments are binding ‘as to the results to be achieved’. It can be 
8 For a detailed discussion on the Framework Decision, see M.S. Groenhuijsen & A. Pemberton, “Th e 
EU Framework Decision for Victims of Crime: Does Hard Law Make a Diff erence?”, European 
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 2009, pp. 43–59.
9 Parliamentary Papers II, 2000/01, 27 213, no. 2, p. 3.
10 Letters from the Dutch Government to the Commission and the Council dated 20 March 2002, 
Reference 5154783/02, not published.
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argued that the resultant de jure or de facto position must do justice to the interests 
that these instruments are to serve under the Treaty.’11 Accordingly, the case law 
developed by the Court of Justice on the implementation of directives also applies to 
framework decisions. With respect to this case law, the Commission distinguishes 
four criteria. Th e fi rst criterion is that the form and the means of transposition must 
be chosen in such a way that the directive has its intended eff ect, given its object.12 
Th e second criterion requires the Member States to implement directives in a manner 
that fully corresponds with legal certainty requirements, and transpose them into 
mandatory provisions of domestic law.13 Th e third criterion is that the provision need 
not be enacted in precisely the same words in an express legal provision. Th e existence 
of general legal principles may suffi  ce if these principles actually guarantee the full 
implementation of the directive and create a suffi  ciently precise and clear legal 
situation.14 Th e fourth criterion is that directives must be implemented within the 
time allowed for the purpose.15
In reviewing the implementation, the Commission emphasises that ‘the formulation 
of the Framework Decision leaves the Member States with considerable room for 
manoeuvre in transposing it’.16 In a few cases, an article of the Framework Decision 
does not require any legislative initiative but only practical implementation.17 Th e 
measures notifi ed by the Member States18 prompt the Commission to conclude, 
however, that not a single Member State has fully transposed the Framework Decision. 
In the evaluation process, the Commission seems to be interested exclusively in the 
textual transposition of the instrument, and not in any other executive measure 
implementing the provisions regarding more practical issues.19 Only with respect to a 
few national transposition eff orts does the report reveal a clear view on the legal 
nature of national implementation. For example, the Commission says about the Irish 
‘Victims’ Charter that it ‘lacks mandatory status’.20 It concerns a guide that is not 
intended to interpret existing legislation or confer rights on victims. Scotland does 
not come up to the mark either. In addition to legislation, the Law Society reported 
guidelines, which, according to the Commission, ‘although relevant, have no solid 
11 Report from the Commission on the basis of Article 18 of the Council Framework Decision of 
15 March 2001 on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, COM(2004) 54 fi nal, p. 4.
12 In this context, the Commission refers to CJEC case 48/75, Royer, ECR 1976, p. 497.
13 CJEC case 300/81, Commission v. Italy, ECR 1983, p. 449.
14 CJEC case 29/84, Commission v. Germany, ECR 1985, p. 1661.
15 CJEC case 52/75, Commission v. Italy, ECR 1976, p. 277.
16 Report, p. 4.
17 Report, pp. 15 and 21.
18 Collected in the Annex to the Commission Report based on Article 18 of the Council framework-
decision of 15 March 2001 concerning the status of the victims in criminal procedures 
(COM/2004/54/F), SEC(2004) 102.
19 M.J. Borgers, ‘Implementing Framework Decisions’, Common Market Law Review 2007, pp. 1361–
1386.
20 Report, p. 9.
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legal basis: there are doubts as to the real mandatory status of the Law Society of 
Scotland’s guidelines’.21 What is lacking in the Commission’s report, however, is an 
express assessment of the status of the victim policy of the Dutch Public Prosecution 
Service. Th e Commission states that review is very diffi  cult because of the Member 
States’ considerable room for manoeuvre and the broad objectives of the provisions of 
the Framework Decision. In this context, it points to the open formulation of Article 
8, for example, which requires ‘a suitable level of protection for victims’.22 Th e 
Commission invites the Member States to ensure complete transposition and to 
describe all measures taken and forward these to the Commission with the text of the 
relevant statutory and administrative provisions. Th is invitation shows that according 
to the Commission, the Framework Decision can also be transposed by taking 
practical measures but that these should be based on statutory and administrative 
measures.
3.4. CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL
Aft er a discussion in the CATS23, one passage was added to the Council’s 
implementation report, which relied heavily on the Commission’s report: ‘Th e 
Commission recalled in this context that Framework Decisions must be transposed 
by binding legal instruments and that it is not suffi  cient that this is made by 
administrative instructions or practical arrangements. Th is conclusion fl ows from 
Article 34 TEU as well as longstanding jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in respect 
of Directives, which is applicable mutatis mutandis in this regard.’24 Th is is diff erent 
from what the Commission said in this respect, because in its report, the Commission 
pointed out that in the case of some articles, the requirement that the provisions have 
to be transposed only into legally binding instruments did not apply. In addition, the 
CATS introduces a distinction between legally binding instruments on the one hand, 
and administrative instructions or practical arrangements on the other, a distinction 
that the Commission did not use, at least not in as explicit terms. In its rejection of 
implementation by means of practical measures, this passage is much more outspoken 
than the Commission’s report.
21 Report, p. 7.
22 Report, p. 21.
23 Th e Committee Article Th irty-Six, a Council committee provided for in article 36 (old) TEU, 
composed of public servants of the Member States. It carries out preparatory duties with regard to 
the legislative process and other activities of the Council.
24 Note from the Article 36 Committee to Coreper/Council on the Draft  Report on the implementation 
of the Framework Decision of 15 March 2001, 15 December 2004, number 14830/2/04, pp. 4–5.
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4. THE LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
4.1. THE GOVERNMENT’S POSITION
In 2004, the Minister of Justice introduced a legislative proposal designed to defi ne 
the victim’s position in criminal proceedings. In the Explanatory Memorandum25, 
however, the Government took the position that the Framework Decision does not 
have to be transposed into primary legislation but that transposition into policy rules 
is suffi  cient. Even so, it introduced a legislative proposal but apparently, the Government 
felt that it was important to make it clear that the reason for that did no lie in the 
requirements placed on the transposition of framework decisions. Th is is already 
evident to some extent by its summary of the Commission’s evaluation report: 
‘Unfortunately, the report on the Netherlands justifi es the conclusion that the Dutch 
view that most Framework Decision provisions have already been implemented 
through existing instructions relating to the working procedures of the Public 
Prosecution Service and the police in the Victim Care Instructions as adopted by the 
Board of Procurators General was apparently not presented clearly enough.’ Th e 
Government refers to current case law: it invokes the freedom to choose form and 
means, but it also realises that implementation is binding as to the result. At the same 
time, this result should fi t into the statutory system and consistent legal practices: 
‘Th is does not necessarily mean, according to the Government, that all obligations 
should be enshrined in primary legislation.’ In its opinion, it is clear that the intended 
result is achieved; in any case, there is no real diff erence between implementation as 
now envisaged in the Code of Criminal Procedure and implementation as originally 
enshrined in policy rules: ‘the codifi cation of a number of policy rules does not entail 
any substantial change in the eff orts of the police and the Public Prosecution Service 
as already made on the ground of the Instructions.’
4.2. PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION
According to the minister, the necessity of a statutory regulation lies primarily in the 
recognition of the victim as an interested party in criminal proceedings and certainly 
not in the requirements placed on the transposition of the Framework Decision.26 
However, a statutory regulation has an extra normative eff ect and provides a clearer 
guide than an instruction, ‘as the latter allows the option to derogate from it’. 
Remarkably, the minister raises the power to derogate in this context. Below, it will be 
shown that it is the existence of this power that deprives the policy rules of the Public 
Prosecution Service from the legally binding nature that the valid transposition of the 
Framework Decision requires.
25 Parliamentary Papers II, 2004/05, 30 143, no. 3, particularly p. 2.
26 Parliamentary Papers II, 2005/06, 30 143, no. 8, p. 2.
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Th e minister issued a remarkable statement in the Senate, however: ‘Th e [legislative 
proposal] is important from the perspective of the victim’s position in criminal 
proceedings and from the perspective of the implementation of the underlying 
Framework Decision. In this context, it is also important to note that it is not suffi  cient 
to draw up policy rules for the purpose of implementing the Framework Decision. 
Regulating the position of victims requires a formal statutory basis.’27 Apparently, the 
minister was now convinced that for the purposes of implementing the Framework 
Decision, it is not suffi  cient to enable the Public Prosecution Service to adopt policy 
rules. He failed to advance any arguments for this position, however, which could be 
due to the reshuffl  e at the ministry: by now, a new minister has taken offi  ce and he 
may hold diff erent views on this subject.
5. ASSESSMENT OF THE TRANSPOSITION
5.1. ARE REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANSPOSING FRAMEWORK 
DECISIONS AND DIRECTIVES IDENTICAL?
Th e treaty texts describing framework decisions and directives suggest that they must 
be transposed according to identical rules. According to Article 288 TFEU, a directive 
is ‘binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is 
addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.’ 
Th is formulation is identical to that of Article 249 (old) TEC and nearly the same 
words are used with respect to framework decisions in Article 34 (old) TEU. Even so, 
a number of diff erences between the two instruments stand out. For example, in 
Article 34 (old) TEU, the direct eff ect of framework decisions is excluded. In spite of 
the foregoing, the Court of Justice has ruled that in specifi c circumstances the national 
courts are obliged to interpret national law in conformity with framework decisions.28 
For this reason, the courts may and must rectify simple implementation defects.
It is sometimes claimed that as far as their legal status is concerned, framework 
decisions are very diff erent from directives, because they are made in another context. 
In the context of police and judicial cooperation, the Member States have entered into 
an intergovernmental alliance, which allows them to retain much of their sovereignty.29 
Also in view of the indeterminate nature of many articles in framework decisions, 
another transposition framework would have to be used. According to Article 34 (old) 
EU, framework decisions could be adopted, however, for the harmonization of 
statutory and administrative measures, just like directives. Th e Court of Justice 
concludes from the foregoing that framework decisions are of an equally mandatory 
27 Proceedings I, 2008/09, 1, p. 20.
28 CJEC case C-105/03, Pupino, ECR 2005, p. I-5285.
29 M.J. Borgers, ‘Implementing Framework Decisions’, Common Market Law Review 2007, pp. 1361–
1386.
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nature as directives, from which the obligation of interpretation in conformity with 
the framework decision follows. Th e most important diff erences between directives 
and framework decisions relate primarily to the way in which they are made and the 
relevant regulatory controls. Based on the wording of the relevant treaty articles, there 
is no reason to assume that there is any diff erence with respect to transposition 
requirements. Th is means that the Member States do have some room for manoeuvre 
at the time of the deliberations in the Council, but not at the transposition stage.30
5.2. TRANSPOSITION REQUIREMENTS OF DIRECTIVES
What requirements are imposed by Article 288 TFEU and what does it mean that 
directives ‘leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods’? First and 
foremost, Member States are obliged to choose the most appropriate form and methods 
to ensure that the directive has its intended eff ect, given its object.31 Th ey are under 
the obligation to adopt all measures of national law that are necessary to implement 
legally binding legislative acts of EU law (Article 291 TFEU). Member States must 
ensure that the directive is transposed fully and accurately and they may not confi ne 
themselves to transposing it for the most part.32 Th e Court of Justice rejected the way 
in which Belgium had transposed directive provisions, because it had used ‘mere 
administrative practices, which by their nature can be changed as and when the 
authorities please and which are not publicized widely enough’.33 Th e Court of Justice 
ruled that the totality of the directive provisions and the nature of the measures 
prescribed showed that they were intended to be transposed into national provisions 
‘which have the same legal force as those which apply in the Member States’. Th is 
means that a Member State has not complied with the requirements of Article 249 
(old) EC if it ‘simply relies on existing practices or even just the tolerance which is 
exercised by the administration’.34 According to the Court of Justice, this is not 
permitted because it is contrary to the requirement of legal certainty. In its decisions, 
the Court of Justice holds that ‘each Member State must implement directives in a 
manner which fully meets the requirement of legal certainty and must consequently 
transpose their terms into national law as binding provisions’.35
30 B. Kurcz & A. Łazowski, ‘Two Sides of the Same Coin? Framework Decisions and Directives 
Compared’, Yearbook of European Law 2006, pp. 177–203.
31 CJEC case 48/75, Royer, ECR 1976, p. 497.
32 CJEC case 91/79, Commission v. Italy, ECR 1980, p. 1099; CJEC case 92/79, Commission v. Italy, 
ECR 1980, p. 1115.
33 CJEC case 102/79, Commission v. Belgium, ECR 1980, p. 1473, point 11.
34 Point 10. Th is assessment framework was repeated in CJEC case 300/81, Commission v. Italy, ECR 
1983, p. 449, CJEC case 168/85, Commission v. Italy, ECR 1986, p. 2945, CJEC case 429/85, 
Commission v. Italy, ECR 1988, p. 843, CJEC case C-236/91, Commission v. Ireland, ECR 1992, p. 
I-5933, CJEC case C-381/92, Commission v. Ireland, ECR 1994, p. I-215 and CJEC case C-242/94, 
Commission v. Spain, ECR 1995, p. I-3031.
35 CJEC case 239/85, Commission v. Belgium, ECR 1986, p. 3645.
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According to the Court of Justice, the implementation of directives does not 
necessarily require legislative action in every Member State. ‘In particular the existence 
of general principles of constitutional or administrative law may render implementation 
by specifi c legislation superfl uous.’ Th e Court of Justice does attach quality 
requirements to these general principles. Th ese must ensure the full application of the 
directive and the legal situation arising from these principles must be suffi  ciently clear 
and precise where the directive intends to create rights for individuals. In addition, 
the benefi ciaries must be able to ascertain the full extent of their rights and rely on 
them before the national courts. Th e latter is especially important where rights are 
conferred on citizens of other Member States, who are less familiar with the 
principles.36 Later, the Court of Justice ruled that ‘a general legal context may, 
depending on the content of the directive, be adequate for the purpose’ of the directive. 
Th is general legal context is subject to the same quality requirements.37 Th is case law 
was applied to the Netherlands in cases where directives had been transposed into 
ministerial regulations, inter alia.38 Th e Netherlands had not transposed a number of 
directive provisions, arguing that ministerial practice substantively complied with 
these provisions, because the relevant ministry exercised great restraint in granting 
licences. Th e Court of Justice did not approve of this because it was inconsistent with 
the requirement of legal certainty, and it ruled that simple administrative practices 
that may be changed at the administration’s discretion do not constitute correct 
fulfi lment. Irrespective of whether such administrative practices are in line with the 
directive provisions, the conditions relating to the granting of licences must be laid 
down in normative rules.39 In one of these cases, the Court of Justice even stated quite 
bluntly that Member States have to create a clear legal framework to ensure the full 
application of directives, not only in fact but also in law.40
Where administrative regulations allowing derogations in exceptional cases are 
used, problems may arise. In a case against Germany, the Commission stated that its 
transposition was defective because ‘administrative circulars need not necessarily be 
observed when an atypical situation arises, that is to say, a situation which the author 
of the administrative provisions could not, or did not wish to, resolve by reason of the 
fact that he had to settle the problem in a general way.’ In addition, these administrative 
regulations bind only the government and cannot be enforced by individuals. Th e 
Court of Justice agreed with that position and ruled that the directive had therefore 
not been ‘implemented with unquestionable binding force, or with the specifi city, 
precision and clarity required by the case-law of the Court in order to satisfy the 
36 CJEC case 29/84, Commission v. Germany, ECR 1985, p. 1661.
37 CJEC case 363/85, Commission v. Italy, ECR 1987, p. 1733, CJEC case 252/85, Commission v. France, 
ECR 1988, p. 2243 and CJEC case C-360/87, Commission v. Italy, ECR 1991, p. I-791.
38 CJEC case 236/85, Commission v. the Netherlands, ECR 1987, p. 3989 and CJEC case 339/87, 
Commission v. the Netherlands, ECR 1990, p. I-851.
39 Repeated in CJEC case C-131/88, Commission v. Germany, ECR 1991, p. I-825.
40 CJEC case 339/87, Commission v. the Netherlands, ECR 1990, p. I-851.
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requirement of legal certainty’. Th e Court of Justice stated explicitly that there has to 
be ‘a specifi c legal framework’.41 It also rejected a method of transposition used by 
Germany by which, without any legislative action, individual operators had been 
informed about the contents of a directive by means of circulars and local instructions.42 
An important view in this regard was that the relevant individuals could not, perhaps, 
rely on these circulars.43
Even though a statutory regulation is not necessary, the application of the 
provisions of the directive has to be ensured by means of such a specifi c and clear legal 
context that if individuals may derive rights from this directive, they must be able to 
know these rights in the national situation and rely on them before the national 
courts.44 Th is is all the more true where these individuals are citizens of other Member 
States.45 Th is strict scrutiny of the use of non-legislative transposition methods, 
resulting from the requirement that implementing measures are fully legally binding, 
is derived by the Court of Justice from the high-valued principles of legal certainty 
and enforceability before the national courts. Reliance on general principles of 
constitutional or administrative law is therefore not readily accepted.46
5.3. ASSESSMENT OF POLICY RULES AGAINST TRANSPOSITION 
REQUIREMENTS
Can it be concluded that the policy rules of the Public Prosecution Service, considering 
their legal status, comply with the transposition requirements of the Framework 
Decision? Th e objective of the Framework Decision is important in this context: the 
harmonization of statutory and administrative provisions relating to the status and 
the most signifi cant rights of the victim.47 It is clear that the Framework Decision 
requires at least the harmonization of normative provisions: the provisions are 
intended to be transposed into national provisions that carry the same force of law as 
those applied in the Member States.48 Th e provisions have to be transposed into 
regulations that are at least as binding as existing regulations.
Do the policy rules come under the prohibition against simple administrative 
practices which, by their nature, can be changed at the administration’s discretion 
and which have not been publicized widely enough? Th e public access requirement 
41 CJEC case C-59/89, Commission v. Germany, ECR 1991, p. I-2607.
42 CJEC case C-58/89, Commission v. Germany, ECR 1991, p. I-4983.
43 Also in CJEC case C-306/89, Commission v. Greece, ECR 1991, p. I-5863.
44 CJEC case C-190/90, Commission v. the Netherlands, ECR 1992, p. I-3265.
45 CJEC case C-365/93, Commission v. Greece, ECR 1995, p. I-499, CJEC case C-96/95, Commission v. 
Germany, ECR 1997, p. I-1653 and CJEC case C-144/99, Commission v. the Netherlands, ECR 2001, 
p. I-3541.
46 S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, p. 84–85.
47 Recitals 4 and 8 of the Framework Decision.
48 Cf. Commission v. Belgium, see above.
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seems to be fulfi lled through the publication of the policy rules in the Government 
Gazette. Th is means that the fi rst condition has been fulfi lled, but what about the 
other criteria? It may be a problem that the policy rules are drawn up and changed by 
the Public Prosecution Service itself, but the policy is formed centrally and is not mere 
practical implementation. Th e adopted rules have binding force within the hierarchy 
of the Public Prosecution Service and as such they are more than simple practice. It 
remains to be seen, however, whether they satisfy the requirement of legal certainty, 
because this means that that directives must be transposed into mandatory provisions 
of domestic law. Do the policy rules of the Public Prosecution Service satisfy this 
requirement?
Are the policy rules perhaps suffi  ciently mandatory because their placement in a 
general legal context ensures the actual and full application of the Framework Decision 
in a suffi  ciently determinate and clear way? In this context, it is important that the 
recognition of the principle of legitimate expectations means that the Public 
Prosecution Service may be barred from prosecuting a case if it acts contrary to a 
published policy rule. Th e question arises whether this is suffi  cient.49 In this context, 
it is problematic that the Public Prosecution Service is empowered to derogate from a 
published policy rule, provided that its decision to so do is suffi  ciently substantiated. 
Th e Court of Justice ruled against Germany on the ground of a similar administrative 
power of derogation.50 So this is a negative indication.
In addition, strict requirements are placed on a ‘general legal context’ if individuals 
should be able to derive rights from it, certainly where they are citizens of other 
Member States. Th e Framework Decision provides, inter alia, that Member States 
must take account of ‘the disadvantage of living in a diff erent Member State from the 
one in which the crime was committed’.51 It also contains special rules for victims 
who live in another Member State (Article 11). Th e notion that foreign victims 
understand how to invoke before the Dutch courts obligations of the police and 
judicial authorities that are enshrined in the policy rules of the Public Prosecution 
Service should be dismissed as improbable. Besides, it is not at all in the interests of 
the victim if the Public Prosecution Service is barred from prosecuting a case as a 
sanction; by contrast, this confl icts with his own interests. Th ese considerations 
inevitably lead to the conclusion that the Framework Decision intends to guarantee 
rights, partially with regard to foreign victims. Th e Court’s case law does not demand 
that directives contain concrete individual rights, as a prerequisite for the invocation 
of the requirement of fully legally binding force concerning the transposition measure. 
It requires particularly that the individuals’ legal position is safeguarded as a result of 
the implementation process.52
49 A question that is answered in the affi  rmative by Groenhuijsen & Pemberton, op. cit., p. 49–50.
50 CJEC case C-59/89, Commission v. Germany, ECR 1991, p. I-2607, see above.
51 Recital 8 of the Framework Decision.
52 S. Prechal, Directives in EC Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, p. 109–110.
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6. CONCLUSION
Th e question this article addressed was whether European law allows Member States 
to transpose European legislation into prosecution policy guidelines. An answer to 
this question can be provided with a view to the Dutch implementation of the 
Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal procedure. Th e Dutch 
Government’s original position that the Framework Decision could be transposed 
into policy rules was not explicitly rejected by the European Commission in its 
implementation report. However, the Government decided to draft  a legislative 
proposal, partly because of its refl ection on the role of victims in criminal proceedings. 
Dutch researchers took the view that the position of victims should not be expressed 
in terms of obligations of means resting on the police and the Public Prosecution 
Service, but as subjective rights of the victim himself, laid down in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure. Th e Public Prosecution Service must therefore give up part of its 
scope for policy-making in favour of the legislator.
Th e question is whether this shift  in powers also necessarily follows from the 
European law relating to the Member States’ transposition obligations. As far as the 
Framework Decision is concerned, the conclusion must be drawn that it cannot be 
transposed into policy rules of the Public Prosecution Service. Th e requirements 
placed by the Court of Justice on the transposition of directives, and that are applicable 
to framework decisions, do not exclude the use of policy rules, provided that these 
satisfy strict quality requirements. It is in this respect that the policy rules of the 
Public Prosecution Service, such as the Victim Care Instructions, are inadequate, 
however. Th e binding status of policy rules is insuffi  cient and they are not suitable to 
be relied on by victims, particularly if they live abroad. A statutory regulation such as 
the one proposed, however, will without doubt satisfy the requirements based on 
Article 288 TFEU.
In general, this assessment does not show that transposing European legislation 
into policy rules of the Public Prosecution Service is never permitted, for the nature 
of the measures implementing European instruments depends on more than one 
factor. A signifi cant factor is the degree to which individuals are able to derive rights 
from the provisions of the directive or the framework decision. Particularly where 
these individuals come from another country, strict requirements are placed on the 
legal nature of the implementation. Prosecution policy guidelines will, in these cases, 
lack the full legally binding force that is required by the Court of Justice’s case law.
Th is conclusion keeps its relevance despite the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. A fi rst reason for that lies in the above claim that the transposition of 
framework decisions and of directives are subject to the same requirements. Th is 
means that the transposition of the directives that will be issued in the fi eld of criminal 
law in the future must satisfy the same conditions as the transposition of framework 
decisions. A second reason is that with eff ect from 1 November 2014, the Court of 
Justice will have jurisdiction in the entire fi eld of police and judicial cooperation, and 
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the Commission will be able to institute infringement proceedings with respect to all 
instruments adopted before the fi rst of November 2009, too.53 In these circumstances, 
transposing framework decisions into policy rules will immediately come under fi re 
as well.
53 Protocol (No. 36) on transitional provisions, Article 10, to the Treaty of Lisbon.
